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Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations




Today more and more new and vexing problems reach the
courts and they call for the highest order of thoughtful exploration
and careful study.
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger
May 18, 19711
When Chief Justice Burger announced the decision in Harris v.
New York 2-- holding that statements elicited in violation of M iranda v.
Arizona3 may be used to impeach-he reportedly characterized it as a
matter "of interest mostly to members of the bar" and not worth de-
scribing from the bench.4 On the surface, his opinion for the Court-
joined by Justices Blackmun, Harlan, Stewart and Whiteu-does indeed
give an impression of little general interest or importance. It is very
short-just eleven paragraphs-and is written in the flat, descriptive
style typical of simple and uncontroversial cases. The initial six para-
graphs set out the facts; the seventh argues that Miranda cannot be
regarded as controlling; and the remainder of the opinion consists of
four arguments-really assertions-in support of the Court's result.
There is no indication that important considerations of policy have
been weighed or that significant practical results may flow from the
decision. Rarely, however, has so short an opinion concealed so much.
0 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. B.A. 1959, Brooklyn College; LL.J. 1902,
Yale Law School.
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School. A.B. 1960, Princeton University; LL.B. 1963,
Yale Law School.
1. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1971, at 28, col. I (Remarks entitled "The Necessity for
Civility," delivered before the American Law Institute).
2. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
8. 384 US. 486 (1966).
4. Washington Post, Feb. 25, 1971, at A-i, col. 7.
5. Mr. Justice Brennan wrote a dissenting opinion for himself and Justices Douglas
and Marshall. Mr. Justice Black dissented without opinion.
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The result reached in Harris was, we think, wrong. But that is not
the reason why, or the perspective from which, we have chosen to focus
on the case. 6 Nor do we wish to use Harris as a vehicle for entering tie
ongoing debate about the proper role of the Supreme Court in the
American system of government.7 In the course of our discussion, we
will suggest that the opinion, in its haste to decide a broad and con-
troversial question of constitutional law, ignores a narrower ground
of decision which would have compelled a contrary result; and that its
brevity and unclarity leave the lower courts without guidance concern-
ing recurrent and related issues. But in the main, our criticisms are
not of that order. They are, first, that the majority, in crucial respects,
flatly misstates both the record in the case before it and the state of the
law at the time the decision was rendered; and second, that each of the
arguments set forth by the Court masks a total absence of analysis and
provides no support for its result.
If Harris were but an isolated instance of these faults, it would still
be a source of concern. But, unfortunately, it is not alone. To illustrate
this, we have, in the footnotes, made a number of cross-references to
Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Wyman v. James,"
which upheld warrantless "visits" to the homes of nonconsenting wel-
fare recipients. Since the deficiencies of the James opinion are apparent
on its face and are ably highlighted by Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent,
there would be little point in our addressing that case on its merits.
But we have found some disturbing similarities of argumentation and
some striking parallels in the manner in which the Court on the twro
occasions treated the record and the relevant sources-parallels which
suggest that Harris may not be an aberration.
Reasonable men can and do differ about the proper role of the Su-
preme Court,9 as they can and do about the balance to be struck be-
tween "liberty" and "order." But there is little room for disagreement
about the desirability in Supreme Court adjudication of reasoned ar-
gument as opposed to arrogant pronunciamento or about the undesir-
ability, indeed the intolerability, of what is, at best, gross negligence
concerning the state of the record and the controlling precedents.' 0
6. Compare p. 1226.
7. See Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court,
84 HAIv. L. REv. 769, 770 (1971), and sources cited id. at 770 nn.4 & 5.
8. 400 US. 309 (1971); see notes 39, 40, 64, 109 and 101 inlra.
9. See Wright, supra note 7.
10. Speaking at the annual dinner of the Minnesota Law Review on May 7, 1971,
Professor Kurland repeated his charge that the late Warren Court reached its results
"disingenuously" and "fraudulently." Compare Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term,
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Because we have chosen to focus on unarguable vices, this Comment
does not aspire to the sweep and scope of much academic criticism of
the Court. Our task, though narrow, is important nonetheless. Put
simply, it is to help keep the Court to traditional standards of candor
and logic.
The relevant facts in Harris can be briefly stated. Petitioner was ar-
rested on January 7, 1966, and taken to police headquarters, where he
was questioned about drug transactions which allegedly took place on
January 4 and 6. He was given "no warning of a right to appointed
counsel"" and during the questioning indicated that he would "rather
see a lawyer before I keep on.'1 2 Nevertheless, the questioning con-
tinued, and petitioner made certain incriminating statements.
At his trial for two counts of drug sale, petitioner testified in his
own behalf and denied commiting the alleged crimes. On cross-exam-
ination, and over petitioner's objection, some incriminating statements
from his pre-trial interrogation were read and he was asked whether
he remembered them. Petitioner said that he remembered some but
not others.13 The jury was instructed that it could consider the con-
tents of the pre-trial statement solely for purposes of evaluating peti-
tioner's "believability."' 4 It convicted him on the second count but
Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Government," 78 HARv. L. Rxv. 143, 145 (1964). At the same dinner he went on
to assert:
The Burger Court has effected one other change of some importance. It has already
changed the Court's aficionados into the Court's critics. [Anthony Lewis is the only
alleged changeling unmasked by name.) Suddenly an institutional value has loomed
on the horizons of those who carefully avoided seeing that value when the Warren
Court was in its ascendancy.
In light of this attempted gun-spiking, it may not be amiss explicitly to record that
although we certainly fall generally in the camp of the late Court's admirers, it would be
difficult to charge us with an uncritical tolerance of that Court's failures of consistency
and logic. See, e.g., Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
79 YAz L.J. 1205, 1208-12 (1970).
11. 401 U.S. at 224. The questioning took place before the Court's decision in Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), but the trial was held after it. Thus under Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Miranda rules were applicable.
12. Appendix in the Supreme Court at 74 [hereinafter Appendix), Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971). He subsequently indicated he would be satisfied to see a lawyer
"tomorrow." Id.
13. Id. at 58-63. Concerning the transaction for which he was convicted, petitioner
testified at trial that the bags that had been sold contained baking powder rather than
heroin. Id. at 30-31. He was then asked on cross-examination whether lie recalled having
admitted to the police that he had bought "two five-dollar bags of heroin for Bermudez,"
and that he had "handed the narcotics to Bermudez who had given him twelve dollars
and half of the heroin in one of the envelopes." See Brief of District Attorney of New York
County at 12, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). There can be no doubt, therefore-as
indeed the Chief Justice acknowledged-that the impeachment was direct rather than
collateral.
14. Appendix, supra note 12, at 95.
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was unable to agree on the first. The New York appellate courts
affirmed the conviction,' 5 and the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari.16
I. The Majority's Representation of the Record
Crucial to the Court's conclusion is its assertion that "Petitioner
makes no claim that the statements made to the police were coerced
or involuntary."'.7 The record is dear, however, that petitioner made
precisely that claim in the courts below,' 8 and reiterated it before the
Supreme Court in his briefs and oral argument.20
The issue arose at the trial in the following way: at the prosecutor's
first reference to the pre-trial statements, petitioner's counsel objected
on the grounds that the state had failed to "lay a foundation and show
that it was voluntarily made, under the law, and in conformity with
the requirements as set up in the case of Miranda v. Arizona."20 The
trial judge overruled the objection, citing People v. Kulis, a New York
case holding an illegally obtained statement to be "admissible on
the question of defendant's credibility as a witness. -"21 At the close of
cross-examination, the objection was renewed. Petitioner's counsel ar-
gued that the interrogation had occurred "prior to any mention of an
attorney," and that "[i]n addition" the statement had been "presented
to the jury before any examination was had, so that legal voluntariness
of this statement" could not be established.2- The trial judge responded
as follows:
Let the record reflect, Mr. Projansky, for you, that you are taking
an exception to the fact that under the Huntley case, it was not
offered on a basis of notice required under 831 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, that you also have an exception under the
fact that it-violates the Miranda against Arizona decision in the
United States Supreme Court. a
15. People v. Harris, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S2d 245, aff'd, 25 N.Y.2d 175,
250 N.E.2d 349, 303 N.YS2d 71 (1969) (per curiam).
16. 398 U.S. 937 (1970).
17. 401 U.S. at 224. The Court's assertion is crucial because it later states that an
inadmissible statement can be used to impeach "provided of course that the trustworthi-
ness of the evidence satisfies legal standards." Yd. The reference to "legal standards"
apparently relates to the "voluntariness of the confession." Id. at 229 n.2.
18. Appendix, supra note 12, at 57, 69.
19. Petition for Certiorari at 10, Brief for Petitioner at 11, 19, 24, Transcript of Oral
Argument at 12, 18, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
20. Appendix, supra note 12, at 57 (emphasis added).
21. People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 822-23, 221 N.E.2d 541-42, 274 N.Y.S. 873, 875 (19G6).
22. Appendix, supra note 12, at 69. Counsel was cut off by the trial judge before he
could complete the sentence, but the meaning is clear.
23. Id. at 70 (emphasis added).
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The trial judge thus ruled, in effect, that no hearing was required to
establish admissibility under either Miranda or the pre-Miranda vol-
untariness tests, since even if the statement were found inadmissible
under both tests, it could still be used to impeach under the holding
of the Kulis case.24
In the state appellate proceedings, neither the petitioner nor the
state drew any distinction between statements obtained in violation of
Miranda and those which are involuntary in the pre-Miranda sense.25
The assumption of both parties throughout these proceedings was the
same as that of the trial court: that an illegally obtained statement
can be used to impeach regardless of whether the illegality was based
on a violation of Miranda or of pre-Miranda standards of voluntariness.
As the state's brief in the Appellate Division put it:
It really makes no difference why the Kulis statement was illegal,
and it makes no difference why this appellant's statement was il-
legal. Once it is acknowledged that they are in fact illegal, they
have been as tarred as black as they can get.26
24. Kulis involved a statement whose admissibility was not governed by Miranda. The
court found it inadmissible under Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), and People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963). No distinction was
drawn in Kulis between statements secured in violation of Escobedo and those which
would be deemed involuntary in the more traditional sense of that term.
25. See, e.g., Appellee's Brief at 4, Harris v. People, 31 App. Div. 2d 828, 298 N.Y.S.2d
245 (1969). In referring to those statements which are involuntary in the pre.Miranda
sense, we mean to include those statements which would be deemed involuntary or co-
erced under Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
26. Appellee's Brief, supra note 25, at 4. In its brief in opposition to certiorari, the
state took the position that there was no need for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness,
since
without doubt, the statement would have been ruled involuntary and hence Inad-
missible at the trial, because, as we have already pointed out, it was deficient In terms
of Miranda .... [The District Attorney's Office, because the defect is a Flaring one,
came to precisely the same conclusion, that it was involuntary and inadmissible ....
Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 9-10, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222
(1971). The state did not, in its brief in opposition, distinguish between a statement
taken in violation of Miranda and a statement which would have been deemed Involun-
tary in the pre-Miranda sense. "It is our submission to the Court that Miranda represents
simply a new and heightened gauge of voluntariness." Id. at 4. In refusing to draw such
a distinction, the state was following the New York law which, likewise, drew no such
distinction for impeachment purposes. See People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 221 N.E.2d 541,
274 N.Y.S.2d 873 (1966).
In its brief on the merits, the state shifted its position, arguing that "on its face
there is surely no flaw in the voluntariness of this statement." Brief for Respondent at
35, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). The state also said that "the question of
voluntariness was never raised at the trial .... " Id. (The record, however, clearly establishes
that it was. See p. 1201 supra.) Indeed, the state conceded that "[lf the question of voluu-
tariness is decided adversely to the prosecutor, he may not use tie statement to impeadi
...." (It is not clear whether this purported to be a statement of New York law or federal
constitutional law.)
Thus, in its first brief before the Court, the state apparently conceded that tile state.
ment was involuntary, but argued that even involuntary statements may be used to
impeach; whereas in its second brief, it apparently conceded that if the statement was
involuntary it could not be used to impeach, but argued that the statement was volun-
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Nor did petitioner's briefs or oral argument before the Supreme
Court in any way abandon or concede his involuntariness claim. In
his petition for certiorari, petitioner explicitly argued that Jackson v.
Denno27 required a pre-trial determination of voluntariness before a
statement could be used for any purpose. "Fundamental fairness," he
argued, "requires a pre-trial hearing on the question of voluntari-
ness."
28
During oral argument counsel for petitioner was asked whether
there was any "claim here that the statement was coerced . .. ."29 His
answer was as follows:
[T]he young man who tried this case for legal aid, made such an
objection, and he made it by referring to Jackson vs. Denno and to
section 819(f) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in New York,
which is the statute dealing with a hearing on the question of vol-
untariness .... [W]hen we asked for a hearing on that issue, we
were foreclosed by the prosecution's objection that the result of
such a voluntariness hearing wouldn't prevent him from using it,
and the trial judge... agreed with that on the authority of Kulis
30
One of the Justices then summed up petitioner's position in the follow-
ing exchange:
Q. Well, then, as to coercion, the involuntariness of this state-
ment, do I understand it to be your submission that because of the
attitude the prosecutor took, the ruling of the court was that even
assuming it was coerced it could still be used?
A. Exactly, but I also say-
Q. We should decide this case therefore on the hypothesis, what-
ever the facts may be, that this was coerced?
A. Exactly....
tary. This confusion was somewhat cleared up during the oral argument, where the
latter position was taken.
27. P78 U.S. 368 (1964). Jackson involved a claim of involuntariness in the pre-Miranda
sense.
28. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 19, at 10.
It is respectfully submitted that such an illegally obtained statement cannot be used
unless and until the requirements of a pre-trial determination of voluntariness have
been fulfilled in accordance with Jackson.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
29. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 10.
50. Id. at 10-11.
31. Id. at 12. Petitioner's counsel then went on to restate his position in the following
terms:
I think it was dearly illegally obtained and I point out respectfully that that was
conceded all the way through the New York courts. It was treated as such. It was
not conceded to be involuntary in the classic sense, but by our foreclosure from it,
by the trial judge's reading of Kulis as allowing this in an involuntary case, I think
this is the posture in which this case comes before this Court.
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Petitioner's counsel then went on to catalogue the facts pointing toward
involuntariness. He described the off-the-record preliminary question-
ing as "a secret inquisition, something in the nature of a subtle star
chamber proceeding . ,,*"32 He told the Court that petitioner was a
twenty-three year old addict with a tenth grade education who, at the
time he made the statement, "was suffering from withdrawal symp-
toms." 33 Petitioner also had testified that he could not remember the
interrogation because it had occurred at a time when "my joints was
down and I needed drugs." 34 He had alleged as well that he may have
been suffering from the after effects of an automobile accident which
put him in a hospital for a month, gave him a concussion and affected
his memory;35 and that he was interrogated off the record prior to the
taking of his formal statement in the presence of three assistant district
attorneys and two detectives.3 Finally, petitioner's counsel was asked
whether there was a claim that "the contents of the statements are
untrue." His answer was, "Yes, Judge.""7
It is possible, of course, that an evidentiary hearing would not have
led to a conclusion that the statement was involuntary in the pre-
Miranda sense, but that was not the issue before the Court.3 8 Nor was
that what the Chief Justice said. Joined by four other justices, he as-
serted that "Petitioner makes no claim that the statements made to
the police were coerced or involuntary." This statement is simply in-
correct. In light of the papers and oral argument presented to the
Court, it is difficult to understand how it could have been made.8D
Id. at 13-14. Petitioner's claim that the statement was involuntary in the pre.Miranda
sense was asserted in another relevant context. Mr. Justice Blackman asked whether
petitioner would "be here today" if Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1066), had
held "that retroactivity was directed to the time of the taking of the statement rather
than to the time of the beginning of the trial." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
19, at 19. (The trial in this case postdated Miranda, but the statement was taken before
that decision. See note 11 supra.) Petitioner's counsel answered: "Yes, because In that
posture could they possibly have denied us a hearing on voluntariness"? Transcript of
Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 20. In other words, petitioner asserted that even If
Miranda had not been applicable, he would have "been here" on the voluntariness claim.
32. Id. at 12.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Appendix, supra note 12, at 59.
35. Id. at 64; Brief for Petitioner, supra note 19, at 5.
36. Id.; Appendix, supra note 12, at 72, 74.
37. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 7. Indeed, the New York County
District Attorney's brief acknowledged that the relevant portion of the pre.trial statement
was a "false account." See note 96 infra.
38. Nor did the Court purport to be determining for itself-as It could not properly
do on this record-that the statement was voluntary in the pre-Miranda sense. See,
e.g., Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
39. Mr. Justice Blackmun's opinion for the Court in Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 809
(1971), at one point uses a somewhat similar approach, albeit with respect to a Mnuch less
crucial point. In arguing that most welfare home "visits" are reasonable (an Irrelevant
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It is also surprising, in light of this record, that the Court reached
out to decide the broad constitutional issue of whether a statement
obtained in violation of Miranda may be used to impeach. 40 During
argument, since the claim of respondent accepted by the court below was that a warrant
should have been obtained), the Court notes that Mrs. James received advance written
notice of the visit she refused (with the consequence that her assistance was terminated).
400 U.S. at 320. And so she did. But James was a class action, and all twekc of the
affidavits other than irs. James's filed by the plaintiffs recited that the case worker "most
often" comes without warningl The Court simply notes this troublesome fact in a footnote
and makes no comment whatsoever in response. 400 US. at 320 n3. This is, le suppo-e,
preferable to not mentioning it at all but still seem less than adequate.
40. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 09 (1971). in several ways provides another texatbook
example of reaching out prematurely to decide a broad and novel issue of constitutional
law. (And, like Harris it disregards at least one narrow ground which would have com-
pelled the contrary decision.) The record was so inadequate with respect to some details
of home visits-for example, whether advance notice is typically given, see note 39 supra-
that even counsel for the state conceded in oral argument that a hearing might be appro-
priate to clarify the situation. Transcript of Oral Argument at , Wyman v. James, 400
U.S. 309 (1971). The state further argued that AMirs. James had failed to exhaust her
state remedies, that the Court should withhold decision for the moment to let the state
system grapple with the issue and perhaps build in safeguards which would blunt Mrs.
James's claim of unreasonableness. It is quite clearly settled that the exhaustion require-
ment as such does not apply in Section 1983 actions, which James was. See Damico v.
California, 89 U.S. 416 (1967). But the Court of late has shown a reneed enthusiasm
for having district courts, in 1983 actions as well as others, "abstain" while the state
system clarifies and has the first constitutional crack at the practice under attac. See,
e.g., Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 20 (1971). (On the admittedly fine distinction between the
exhaustion and abstention doctrines in 1983 actions, see, e.g., C. WRIGHTr, LAw. oF FEDOUtL
Coumt 197 (2d ed. 1970):
Mhe Court held [referring to dcNeese v. Board of Education, 
373 US. 668 (1963).
the pedent upon which Damico placed primary reliance] that in a civil rights case
exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not needed, but in doing so it speifi-
cally cited the abstention cases and distinguished them on the ground that in the
case before it there was no issue of state law that might be dispositive.)
If such abstention is proper in First Amendment areas, where the very rights in issue
will be "chilled" while the state system operates, it would surely seem proper in the
James context as well, particularly in light of representations made in the state's brief
concerning the sort of safeguards which might be built in by the state authorities.
Mhea pellee here began but did not complete the administrative 
hearing process.
 a prior termination hearing but did not proceed to a state fair hearing....
Complete exhaustion of administrative remedies was particularly important here
because of the vague nature of the complaint and the essentially administrative nature
of the relief sought. Appellee was complaining about being ased unspecified
questions. The twelve recipients supporting her position complained of the timing of
the visits and the circumstances under which interviews are conducted....
[A] state forum, judicial or administrative, might have been able to alter sub-
stantialy the nature of the questions involved ... by its interpretation of Section
131-a of the New York Social Services law which requires investigation of an applica-
tion and personal contacts but does not mandate a home visit. This would
apparently be a case of first impression for the State agency which could promulgate a
flexible rule or adhere to a strict one.... At the least, they might require a showing
of individual necessity for a home as opposed to an office visit before termination of
aid if such a course were deemed wise.
Brief for Appellant at 43-44,%Wyman v. James. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). Of course the optimism
expressed in the quoted passage is somewhat self-serving, but one thing is clear. a court
genuinely committed to avoiding the decision of issues whose contours cannot dearly be
discerned could have somehow-by remand or a sort of abstention-found a way to
educate itself concerning the precise nature of the visits under attack before permanently
placing on them the imprimatur of constitutional legitimaey.
Additionally, the Court in James made no attempt whatever to counter Air. justice
Mfarshall's argument that unconsented-to visits (as Airs. James's certainly were) have been
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oral argument, counsel for the state was asked the following question
by Mr. Justice Stewart: "What if this had been a coerced confession,
could you impeach him with that?" 41 The answer was as follows:
If this had been a coerced confession, it is the people's view and
the respondent's view that it couldn't have been used for any pur-
pose .... 42
Counsel for the state was then asked what his position would be in a
case where petitioner had claimed, at the trial, that the statement was
involuntary: "Wouldn't you agree that then you have a hearing out-
side of the jury?" The state's reply was unequivocal:
Oh, by all means, Mr. Justice .... there has to be some judicial
forbidden by the supervising federal authorities. Mr. Justice Marshall's suggested non.
constitutional disposition not only would have had the effect of "remanding" the question
to the political processes, but also seems soundly grounded in the language of the federal
Handbook of Public Assistance Administration:
The [state welfare] agency especially guards against violation of legal rights and
common decencies in such areas as entering a home by force, or without permission,
or under false pretenses; making home visits outside of working hours, and par-
ticularly making such visits during sleeping hours;**
DEP'T OF HEW, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANcE A asUNismATioN, Pt. IV, § 2200(a)
(emphasis supplied). A federal regulation, so long as it is within the authority delegated
by a valid federal statute, generally takes precedence over state law. Whether the hand.
book should count as such a regulation seems to us somewhat unclear. The Court did not
address that issue, however, and indeed used the word "forbidden" in relying on other
phrases of the very same regulation to buttress its claim that home visits generally are
reasonable. 401 U.S. at 321. Compare note 64 infra.
Even granting the Court's desire to break with the tradition that only an emergency
can justify invading a citizen's privacy without a warrant, it did so precipitously, without
really knowing what the searches in issue looked like, without letting the state system
operate so as to inform it and perhaps to deal with the searches' more objectionable
features, and without acceding to the apparent federal command that such searches take
place only with the consent of the searched. But just as questionable practices should not be
invalidated in ignorance, they should not be legitimated in ignorance.
41. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 25.
42. Id. This issue was pressed further in the following exchange between Mr. Justice
Stewart and counsel for the state:
Q. I didn't mean an untrue confession, I meant simply an involuntary confession,
could you use that to impeach him?
A. No. Mr. Justice Stewart, I don't think we could, for this reason: The point I am
trying to make is a voluntary confession, if it is voluntary in the traditional sense,
can be relied upon to express the truth, whereas an involuntary confession is subject,
to take the obvious example, a man will say anything to keep from being beaten and
all we have to do is go to some of the countries beyond the Iron Curtain to demon.
state that. There is a point beyond which human endurance can't continue ...
Q. . .. And let's assume further that it is wholly true. Could you have used that to
impeach him?
A. I don't think so, Mr. Justice Stewart, because the thought is that we must define
a class of confessions which may be used for these purposes, and I think once you de.
fine the class as being a true confession rather than a voluntary confession, then you're
getting into extraneous matters that perhaps aren't properly explored in the context
of this.
Q. What you are saying then is that it can't be given any use because it is inherently
unreliable as being involuntary?
A. As being involuntary, yes, Air. Chief Justice (sic).
Id. at 26-27.
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determination of that prior to any concept of throwing this in the
man's face. Just simple justice would compel that.43
Thus the state explicitly conceded that a hearing would have to be
held before a statement alleged to be "coerced or involuntary" could
be used for impeachment. Moreover, as previously demonstrated, the
record plainly established that petitioner had explicitly requested a
hearing to determine whether the statement was involuntary. Accord-
ingly, canons of judicial restraint (to say nothing of "simple justice"
to Mr. Harris, who never did get his voluntariness hearing) should
have led the Court to remand the case to the state courts for a hearing
to determine whether the statement was involuntary in the pre-Mi-
randa sense. It could have done this in a short per curiam opinion such
as the following:
The state concedes that a statement which is involuntary or co-
erced in the pre-Miranda sense may not be used for impeachment
purposes. It also acknowledges that if a hearing is requested to de-
termine whether a statement was involuntary or coerced, the state-
ment may not be used to impeach unless there has been a judicial
determination that it was not involuntary or coerced. At the trial,
petitioner requested a hearing to determine whether his statement
was involuntary. That request was denied, on the ground that it
made no difference-for purposes of impeachment-whether the
statement was involuntary in the pre-Miranda sense.
Accordingly, we remand the case for a hearing. If it is deter-
mined that the statement was involuntary in the pre.Miranda
sense, then the conviction must be reversed. If it is determined
that it was voluntary in the pre-Miranda sense, there will then be
43. Id. at 27-28. The oral argument then proceeded in the following way.
Q. Now your brother on the other side has told us that because of the posture in
which this question arose in the trial court, we must proceed upon the hypothesis
that this was an involuntary confession.
A. Mr. Justice Stewart, I think perhaps Mr. Aurnou may have expressed himself
somewhat more enthusiastically than was his intention. I don't think you have to
make such a presumption because when you read the record and when you see what
it was that was sought to be brought into context here, it was not the voluntariness
of the confession as to voluntariness alone. The only point that was brought into
context was whether it was admissible in terms of Miranda, a question on which all
of us agree, there was never any doubt about that. We had come to that conclusion
months and months and months before this trial.
Q. When .the prosecution sought to use it for impeachment purposes, was there
any request for hearing on the involuntariness of the confession?
A. I would have to get these minutes to refresh my recollection before I could give
you an absolutely definitive answer, Mr. Chief Justice. My recollection is that there
was a hearing for the purpose of discovering whether-there was a hearing requested
for the purpose of discovering whether or not this was admissible, and we all know
it wasn't.
Id. at 28. As demonstrated above, however, a check of the "minutes" would have plainly
established that a hearing to determine the voluntariness of the statement-in addition
to its admissibility under Miranda-had been requested.
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occasion for us to decide the issue whether a statement voluntary
in the pre-Miranda sense but obtained in violation of Miranda may
be used for impeachment purposes.
The Court did not, however, elect to follow this course of judicial
restraint. Instead it reached out to consider an issue about which there
was unanimity among the circuits and little conflict among the states,
and indeed it decided it contrary to the weight of all this authority.44
It should therefore be instructive to examine the arguments offered
by the Court in support of its conclusion.
II. The Majority's Representation of the Precedents
A. Miranda v. Arizona
The most obvious precedential hurdle for the Court in Harris was
of course, Miranda itself, which had held that "the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory ... unless it dem-
onstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the priv-
ilege against self-incrimination. '45 Prior to Harris, that decision had
been widely--indeed, almost unanimously-interpreted to preclude the
impeachment use of statements obtained in violation of its rules.40 The
opinion in Harris, however, disposes of Miranda in its first paragraph
of argument:
Some comments in the Miranda opinion can indeed be read as in-
dicating a bar to use of an uncounseled statement for any purpose,
44. The dissenting opinion summarized the case law as follows:
Six federal Courts of Appeals and appellate courts of 14 States have reached [a result
contrary to that reached by the majority]. United States v. Fox, 403 F.2d 97 (CA 2
1968); United States ex rel. Hill v. Pinto, 394 F.2d 470 (CA 3 1968); Breedlove v. Beto,
404 F.2d 1019 (CA 5 1969); Groshart v. United States 392 F.2d 172 (CA 9 1968); Blair
v. United States, 130 U.S. App. D.C. 322, 401 F.2d 387 (1968); Wheeler v. United
States, 382 F.2d 998 (CA 10 1968); People v. Barry, 237 Cal. App. 2d 154, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 727 (1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1024, 87 S. Ct. 1382, 18 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1967);
Velarde v. People, 466 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1970); State v. Galasso, 217 So.2d 326 (Fla.
1968); People v. Luna, 37 Ill. 2d 299, 226 N.E.2d 586 (1967); Franklin v. State, 6 Md.
App. 572, 252 A.2d 487 (1969); People v. Wilson, 20 Mich. App. 410, 174 N.W.2d 79
(1969); State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960); State v. Catrett,
276 N.C. 86, 171 S.E.2d 398 (1970); State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 422 P.2d
581, cert. denied, 387 U.S. 943, 87 S. Ct. 2074, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1328 (1967); Commonwealth
v. Padgett, 428 Pa. 229, 237 A.2d 209 (1968); Spann v. State, 448 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1969); Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 412, 164 S.E.2d 699 (1968):
Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis. 2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370 (1967); see also Kelly v. King, 1N
So. 2d 525 (Miss. 1967). Only three state appellate courts have agreed with New York
State v. Kimbrough, 109 N.J. Super. 57, 262 A.2d 232 (1970); State V. Butler, 19 Ohio
St. 2d 55, 249 N.E.2d 818 (1969); State v. Grant, 459 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1969).
401 U.S. at 231 n.4. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
46. See cases cited note 44 supra.
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but discussion of that issue was not at all necessary to the Court's
holding and cannot be regarded as controlling. Miranda barred the
prosecution from making its case with statements of an accused
made while in custody prior to having or effectively waiving coun-
sel. It does not follow from Miranda that evidence inadmissible
against an accused in the prosecution's case in chief is barred for
all purposes, provided of course that the trustworthiness of the evi-
dence satisfies legal standards.47
This summary of Miranda is misleading in two respects. First, by stat-
ing that "some" comments "can... be read" to preclude the Harris
result, the Chief Justice suggests that that is but one of several possible
readings. However, a pervasive and unambiguous aspect of Miranda
was its explicit rejection of distinctions based on the manner in which
a statement is used by the Government or the degree to which it is
helpful to it:
The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with
our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equiva-
lent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a
defendant. No distinction can be drawn between statements which
are direct confessions and statements which amount to 'admis-
sions' of part or all of an offense. The privilege against self-incrim-
ination protects the individual from being compelled to incrimi-
nate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of
incrimination. Similarly, for precisely the same reason, no distinc-
tion may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements
alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in
fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the
prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory
by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial
or to demonstrate untruths in the statement given under interro-
gation and thus to prove guilt by implication. These statements
are incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may
not be used without the full warnings and effective waiver required
for any other statement48
Miranda's repeated references to "exculpatory" statements49 were thus
intended to cover precisely the kind of statement at issue in Harris
and the specific use to which it was there put. Nor did these references
pass unnoticed. They were the object of explicit and uncomplimentary
reference in each of the three dissents filed in Miranda. Accordingly,
47. 401 U.S. at 224.
48. 384 U.S. at 476-77 (emphasis added).
49. See also id. at 444.
50. Id. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting and concurring); id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting);
id. at 555 ('White, J., dissenting).
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Miranda not only "can" be read to require reversal of Harris's convic-
tion, it can be read no other way!
Second, it is of course technically accurate to say that Miranda's dis-
cussion of impeachment was not necessary to the Court's holding, since
the statements in Miranda had been used as part of the prosecution's case
in chief. But Miranda did not purport to be an opinion limited to its
precise facts. Indeed, the stated reason for granting certiorari in that
case was because Escobedo v. Iliinois51-which was limited to its facts-
had been "the subject of judicial interpretation" under which "state
and federal courts, in assessing its implications, [had] arrived at vary-
ing conclusions." Miranda purported to "give concrete constitu-
tional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow,"6'
Thus, the opinion was deliberately structtired so that the constitutional
principles-which grew out of the experience of many cases-were set
out before the Court set forth the specific facts of the cases before it.1
Moreover, the opinion said that it was part of its "holding" that an
uncounseled "exculpatory" statement could not be used by the prosecu-
tion. The Court summarized its sixty-three page opinion as follows:
Our holding will be spelled out with some specificity in the pages
which follow but briefly stated it is this: the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the
use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination5M
One might wish to criticize the Miranda opinion for its far-ranging,
"guidebook" format. But, rightly or wrongly, that opinion is what it
is, and it does "follow" from it that evidence inadmissible because of
a Miranda violation "is barred for all purposes." An important part
of Miranda was squarely overruled in Harris; the Court does no ser-
vice by pretending that it wasn't.
This kind of treatment of a troublesome precedent may not be that
unusual. Though more candor was, we think, in order, the Court's be-
51. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
52. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 440-42 (1966).
53. Because of the nature of the problem and because of its recurrent significance
in numerous cases, we have to this point discussed the relationship of the Fifth
Amendment privilege to police interrogation without specific concentration on the
facts of the cases before us. We turn now to these facts to consider the application
to these cases of the constitutional principles discussed above.
Id. at 491. The only previous allusion to the facts in the cases at bar had, significantly,
not specified whether the statements at issue were used as part of the prosecution's case
in chief or by way of impeachment. Id. at 445.
54. Id. at 444.
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havior with respect to Miranda pales beside what it did with Walder
v. United States.5 5 That case, like Miranda, squarely faced the Harris
issue and resolved it in favor of the defendant. But the Harris opinion
is not content flimsily to "distinguish" Walder-instead, by dint of
some skillful editing, it represents it as a supporting and controlling
precedentl
B. Walder v. United States
The Court places its principal reliance on Walder, suggesting that
it is following a general rule laid down in that case and merely extend-
ing it slightly to apply to the facts of Harris, since there is no "differ-
ence in principle" between the two. The Court's entire discussion of
Walder is as follows:
In Walder v. United States, 374 U.S. 62 (1954), the Court permit-
ted physical evidence, inadmissible in the case in chief, to be used
for impeachment purposes.
"It is one thing to say the Government cannot make an affir-
mative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite an-
other to say that the defendant can turn the illegal method
by which evidence in the Government's possession was ob-
tained to his own advantage, and provide himself with a
shield against contradiction of his untruths. Such an exten-
sion of the Weeks doctrine would be a perversion of the
Fourth Amendment.
"[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant af-
firmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the
Government's disability to challenge his credibility." 347 U.S.,
at 65.
It is true that W~alder was impeached as to collateral matters
included in his direct examination, whereas petitioner here was
impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on the crimes
charged. We are not persuaded that there is a difference in prin-
ciple that warrants a result different from that reached by the
Court in Walder.56
The actual situation was, however, considerably different from that
suggested by the Court. Walder did not state the general rule: instead,
it stated a rather special exception to the general rule laid down in
1925 by a unanimous Supreme Court in the case of Agnello v. United
States.57 In Agnello, the Supreme Court had held that a defendant who
55. 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
56. 401 U.S. at 224-25.
57. 269 U.S. 20 (1925). Agnello, in turn, relied on Justice Holnes's opinion for tie
Court in Silverthorne v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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did not, in his direct examination, testify about an illegally seized item,
could not be cross-examined about that item. The Agnello Court's
analysis was as follows:
And the contention that the evidence of the search and seizure was
admissible in rebuttal is without merit. In his direct examination,
Agnello was not asked and did not testify concerning the can of
cocaine. In cross-examination, in answer to a question permitted
over his objection, he said he had never seen it. He did nothing
to waive his constitutional protection or to justify cross-examina-
tion in respect of the evidence claimed to have been obtained by
the search.rB
The Walder case carved out of that general rule a limited exception
responsive to the particular-and unfair-trial tactic of the defendant
in that case. The Government had unlawfully seized heroin from Wal-
der in 1950 and had indicted him for the possession of it. The evi-
dence had been suppressed and the indictment dismissed. Two years
later, the Government indicted him for an entirely different drug of-
fense. At his trial for this latter crime, Walder took the witness stand
and denied the specific acts with which he stood charged. Then-of
his own accord-he went beyond denying these acts and volunteered
testimony that he had never had any narcotics in his possession in his
entire life. At that point, the trial court permitted the Government
to question him about the heroin unlawfully seized from him two
years earlier and to introduce the testimony of the officer who had
made the seizure. It was in this context that the Walder Court held
that where the defendant "[o]f his own accord," goes "beyond a mere
denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was charged," and makes
a "sweeping claim," then the government may "introduce by ways of
rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it .... ,9 The Court in Walder
explicitly reaffirmed the general rule laid down in Agnello:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest
opportunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free
to deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby
giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal
evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its
case in chief.60
Indeed, the Walder Court went out of its way to reconcile its limited
58. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 85 (1925).
59. Walder v. United States, 547 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
60. Id.
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holding with the general rule of Agnello, asserting that Agnello had
"foreshadowed" the Walder result.("
Harris, of course, is like Agnello rather than Walder, and Harris's
conviction would clearly have been reversed had the earlier decision
been followed. Accordingly, the Harris Court did not extend a general
rule laid down in Walder to the facts in the case before it, as it sug-
gested it was doing; instead, it squarely overruled the unanimous
decision in Agnello without even citing it.
Nor was the Harris Court unaware of the Agnello rule it was over-
turning. For it appears to have gone to some pains to excise from its
rendition of Walder all reference to Agnello. Harris's quotation from
Walder (reproduced above) -02 begins its second paragraph with a
bracketed capital letter, indicating that something has been omitted.
That something, it transpires, is Walder's reiteration of the Agnello
principle. What follows is the original passage from Walder. The non-
italicized material is what Harris quoted; the italicized material, what
it omitted.
Take the present situation. Of his own accord, the defendant went
beyond a mere denial of complicity in the crimes of which he was
charged and made the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in
or possessed any narcotics. Of course, the Constitution guarantees
a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation against
him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against
him without thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce
by way of rebuttal evidence illegally secured by it, and therefore
not available for its case in chief. Beyond that, however, there is
hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to
perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to
challenge his credibility.
0 3
It is clear-especially from the (excised) phrase "Beyond that, however"
-that the excised material is the general rule, and the (quoted)
material "beyond that" the Walder exception. The precision of the
Harris Court's editing of the quotation from Walder also suggests that
the omission was not inadvertant. 4
61. Id. at 66.
62. See text at note 56 supra.
63. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954) (emphasis supplied).
64. Again, Wyman v. James, 400 US. 309 (1971), is disturbingly similar. In support
of its irrelevant claim, see note 39 supra, that most home visits are reasonable, the Court
observes:
Forcible entry or entry under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or
snooping in the home are forbidden.
400 U.S. at 321. What the Court omits to mention is that the provision in question, Part
IV, § 2300(a) of the HEW Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, refers to
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It is important to understand the criticism we are here making.
There may be legitimate arguments in favor of overruling the general
rule laid down in Agnello and reiterated in Walder. We do not-at
this point-dispute the conclusion reached by the Court. But it was
misleading for the Court not to acknowledge that there was a general
rule precluding the use of illegally seized evidence for impeaching a
defendant's testimony denying the crime and that it was squarely over-
ruling a unanimous decision of a prior Supreme Court.
The Court does acknowledge that there is a distinction between
Walder and the case at bar: "It is true that Walder was impeached as
to collateral matters included in his direct examination, whereas peti-
tioner here was impeached as to testimony bearing more directly on
the crimes charged."0  But it immediately proceeds to argue-more
precisely, assert-that this is a distinction without a difference: "We
are not persuaded that there is a difference in principle that warrants
a result different from that reached by the Court in Walder."00 That is
all the Court says about the difference between the two cases, leaving
unstated the reasons why it was "not persuaded" that a distinction
which had been deemed dispositive for nearly a generation was not
based on "principle."
There are, in fact, important differences between Walder and Harris
-- differences which at the very least should have been faced. Walder
involved impeachment by means of evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment-an Amendment that does not, in terms, pro-
vide for the exclusion of evidence secured in violation of it. Indeed,
the Fourth Amendment "exclusionary rule" is a court-created device-
of relatively recent vintage-designed to discourage primary violations
of the prohibition against "unreasonable searches and seizures." '07 The
Fifth Amendment, on the other hand, seems on its face to prohibit the
Government from using compelled statements "against" the defen.
dant. 8 It is an exclusionary rule-and a constitutionally created one. 0
entering a home by force, or without permission, or under false pretenses, making
visits outside of working hours....
DEP'T OF HEV, HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION, Pt. IV, § 2300(a)
quoted, 400 U.S. at 346 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). Nowhere does the
Court mention the reference to entry without permission, though it draws support from
the phrases on either side of it. As in Harris, the device of convenient omission (by
paraphrase rather than ellipsis this time) has saved the Court the bother of facing it
passage which, if taken seriously, might have defeated the government's claim. See note
40 supra.
65. 401 U.S. at 225.
66. Id.
67. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
68. The relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows: "nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69. See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
1214
Vol. 80: 1198, 1971
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1214 1970-1971
Harris v. New York
Accordingly, courts would seem less justified in carving exceptions out
of the Fifth Amendment's exclusionary rule than out of the Fourth's.
Moreover, the fact that evidence was secured in violation of the
Fourth Amendment casts no doubt on its reliability, whereas one of
the underlying reasons for excluding evidence obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment is precisely the possibility that it may be un-
trustworthy. Although this is somewhat less true of statements obtained
in violation of the prophylactic rules of Miranda, an important pur-
pose of the Miranda rules was "to guarantee that the accused gives a
fully accurate statement to the police .... 70
It was for these reasons, among others,71 that both before and after
Walder, the weight of federal and state authority was to the effect that
evidence taken in violation of the Fifth-as contrasted with the Fourth
-Amendment, could never be used to impeachY.- The Court in Harris
fails to acknowledge these distinctions between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments. It simply assumes that in the context of impeachment
they are not differences "in principle" deserving even the briefest dis-
cussion.
The distinction the Court does allude to-only to dismiss in a con-
clusory sentence-is also a critical one, in both practical and constitu-
tional terms. There is an important difference between impeaching a
defendant's testimony as to collateral matters and impeaching him as
to testimony bearing directly on the crime charged. The difference-
simply stated-is this: there is a considerable risk that illegally ob-
tained evidence which bears directly on the crime charged will be con-
70. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966); cf. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S.
719 (1966).
71. Permitting impeachment by means of illegally seized evidence is more likely to
induce violations of the Fifth than the Fourth Amendment. For physical evidence is often,
perhaps most often, contraband, and if it is suppressed as to the government's case in
chief, the case will frequently have to be dropped. Confessions and statements, however,
are practically always nothing more than buttressing evidence: suppression of a con-
fession or other statement will seldom cause the prosecution to drop its case. With respect
to a statement, therefore, it would be worthwhile (in a way it would not be with respect
to contraband) for the police to press on and get it illegally when it has become dear
it cannot be obtained legally. For despite the illegality the case will likely go for-ard.
and if the statement can be used for impeachment, it will likely keep the defendant off
the stand or at any rate discredit his testimony. With respect to contraband, however, no
such incentive will exist. For once the search is dedared illegal, the case will likely be
dropped. And Walder situations-where the defendant is later indicted for a similar
crime and on the stand denies ever having transgressed-are obviously rare, surely not
so common as to figure into a policeman's calculus.
72. See generally Annot., 89 A.L.R.2d 478 (1963), and cases cited. Several cases involving
the Mallory rule (Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)) have gone the other
way. See, e.g., Bailey v. United States, 328 F.2d 542 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 US.
972.
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sidered by the jury as direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. This
risk is significantly reduced when the illegally obtained evidence does
not directly relate to the elements of crime charged. This important
difference may be illustrated by contrasting the facts of Walder with
those of Harris. In Walder, the illegally obtained evidence related to
an event which had occurred two years prior to the alleged crime. In
Harris, on the other hand, the illegally obtained statements contained
admissions of elements of the crime with which the defendant then
stood charged. To be sure, the jury-as in Walder-was instructed
not to consider that evidence as bearing on the elements of the of-
fense, but rather only as bearing on the defendant's credibility. It is
possible that the jurors diligently followed this limiting instruction
and cleansed their minds of the contents of the statements when they
were deliberating about the elements of the crime. But surely the risk
of infection is significantly greater in the Harris-type case than in the
Walder-type case.
73
Indeed, it was this very difference that was explicitly and successfully
argued by the Government in its brief in Walder. The Government
pointed out that in Agnello
the suppressed evidence was so closely related in point of time to
the offense charged that there was a real danger that the suppressed
evidence would be considered by the jury as proof of guilt, as of
affirmative benefit to the Government. No such danger existed
here, since the suppressed evidence related to a point in time re-
mote from the offenses charged.74
The Government then concluded that
there was in this case no danger that the supposed evidence would
be used as affirmative evidence in behalf of the Government be-
yond the limited scope for which we contend it was admissible,
i.e., merely to neutralize the effect of petitioner's perjury?'1
A number of recent decisions of the Supreme Court have relied on
the principle that the Court in Harris found unpersuasive. For exam-
ple, Jackson v. Denno76 and Bruton v. United States77 both rest on the
73. To be sure, there is always a risk of the jury's inferring that liars are more likely
to be criminals than truth-tellers, and-where the impeachment evidence relates to a
prior similar crime--of the jury's inferring from that that the defendant is guilty of the
crime charged. These risks, which are fairly common to impeachment evidence, are,
however, considerably easier to guard against than an improper, "truth of the matter
asserted," inference from a statement admitting guilt of the crime charged.
74. Brief for the United States at 32-33, Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954).
75. Id at 33.
76. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
77. 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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conclusion that a limiting instruction cannot be relied upon when a
confession or admission of the crime at issue is involved. "[T]he risk
that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and
the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical
and human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. " Harris,
unfortunately, demonstrates that Bruton was wrong in at least one re-
spect: these limitations can, in fact, "be ignored."
Finally, there is another-almost self-evident--distinction between
Walder and Harris. It is the distinction that Justice Frankfurter ex-
plicitly relied upon in carving the Walder exception out of the general
rule of Agnello. It was this very distinction-as we have previously
noted-that the Chief Justice excised from his quotation of Walder:
Of course, the Constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest op-
portunity to meet the accusation against him. He must be free to
deny all the elements of the case against him without thereby giv-
ing leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evi-
dence illegally secured by it, and therefore not available for its
case in chief.79
There is surely an important difference between using illegally ob-
tained evidence to impeach a defendant who takes the stand only to
deny elements of the offense and using it to impeach the defendant
who goes beyond that. According to Justice Frankfurter and the Court
for which he was writing, it is a difference of constitutional magni-
tude. 0 And it is a difference that was not unfamiliar to the author
of the Harris opinion. While a circuit judge he wrote at least one opin-
ion which rested entirely on the very difference that he dismissed as
not persuasive in Harris. In Lockley v. United Statessl-a case which
is essentially a carbon copy of Harris-Judge Burger, dissenting from
the aflirmance of a conviction, argued that the defendant "must be
permitted to deny the criminal act charged without thereby giving
leave to the government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence
78. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135 (1968). But cf. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74 (1970).
79. NValder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
80. Id.
81. 270 F.2d 915 (D.C. Cir. 1959). In Lockley, the statement at issue was not-in Judge
Burger's view-coerced. It was alleged to have been obtained in violation of the Mallory
rule. Judge Burger explained the difference as follows:
A coerced confession is rejected because it is not a true statement but one exacted by
duress or force and thus inherently unreliable. A confession rejected under Rule 5(a)
for "unnecessary delay" is not discredited as inherently untrustworthy, it is rejected
as a means of enforcing Rule 5(a)-a prophylactic suppression.
270 F.2d at 921 n.1 (Burger, J., dissenting).
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otherwise inadmissible."8 2 He also recognized "the hazards inherent
in letting the full untested written confession in evidence, and then
trying to limit the scope and weight which a jury should give to it.
''8a
Accordingly, he argued that the "proper procedure" was to admit "only
that part of the written statement which does not go to the admission
of acts which constitute necessary elements of the crime itself, but
which at the same time constitute true impeachment .... ,,s4This
distinction was necessary because the "prejudicial impact of the full
confession on the jury cannot be eliminated by instruction from the
bench, no matter how carefully, pointedly, or precisely phrased."80
Judge Burger obviously regarded these distinctions-between im-
peaching as to the elements of the crime and impeaching as to collateral
matters-as distinctions of principle when he wrote his opinion in
Lockley. He apparently changed his mind when he decided Harris.
Judges often do that, as they are surely entitled to (especially when
they have been promoted to a higher court in the interim). But even
a recently elevated judge is obligated to give his readers some clue as
to why distinctions once thought to be constitutionally mandated are
no longer differences "in principle."
III. The Majority's Presentation of the Policy Considerations
A. The benefits of impeachment outweigh the "speculative possi-
bility" that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged.
Having distorted the two most important contrary precedents, the
Court briefly suggests three policy arguments. The first is that
the benefits of [the impeachment] process should not be lost, in
our view, because of the speculative possibility that impermissible
police conduct will be encouraged thereby. Assuming that the ex-
clusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed police conduct,
sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made
unavailable to the prosecution in its case in chief.80
82. 270 F.2d at 921.
83. Id.
84. 270 F.2d at 920.
85. Id. Judge Burger went on to make another argument that he implicitly (see pp.
1201-07 supra) rejected in Harris:
Any other course, it seems to me, would permit the use of proscribed confessions In
rebuttal even in the case where the trial court had taken testimony and held it In-
admissible by virtue of physical or mental coercion, actual or inherent. Can it be
possible to say that a court could on Monday, hold a confession obtained by force
and duress inadmissible, and on Wednesday allow it to impeach the dcfendant's
veracity?
270 F.2d at 921 n.2.
86. 401 U.S. at 225.
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This unsupported assurance of "sufficient deterrence" masks a fail-
ure to consider the mechanism by which exclusionary rules are sup-
posed to deter deliberate police misconduct. The assumption under-
lying such rules is that if illegally obtained evidence can be used in
aid of securing convictions, then the police will have an incentive to
violate the law in instances where they could not secure the evidence
by lawful means.87 Moreover, it is widely acknowledged that absent
an exclusionary rule there would be nothing to overcome this incen-
tive, since other remedies-directed punitively against individual po-
licemen-appear to be unrealistic.8 Accordingly, there is no reason to
expect an exclusionary rule to deter deliberate violations unless it has
eliminated all significant incentives toward that conduct. If an exclu-
sionary rule were to eliminate only part of the incentive-say if it
were to require the exclusion of illegally obtained evidence in 50%
of the cases randomly selected-it could not be expected to deter any-
where near that percentage of violations. For in those instances where
the police could not secure the evidence by lawful means, they
would still have everything to gain and nothing to lose by obtaining
the evidence illegally: they would have helped secure convictions in
half the cases without endangering the convictions--or anything else
of value to them-in the other cases. Accordingly, they would probably
still engage in the prohibited conduct most of the time even though
its fruits could only be used in some of the cases. This would be espe-
cially so in those instances-like the random percentage exclusion
hypothesized above-where the police would not know at tie time
they contemplated the unlawful conduct whether its fruits would or
would not be usable at the trial.
89
87. See generally Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See also Kaufman v. United States,
394 US. 217 (1969), where the Court-holding search daims to be cognizable in § 2255
proceedings-rejected the following argument:
This deterrent function, the Government argues, is adequately served by ite oppor-
tunities afforded a federal defendant to enforce the exclusionary rule before or at
trial, so that the relatively minimal additional deterrence afforded by a post-convic-
tion remedy would not seem to justify, except in special circumstances, the collateral
release of guilty persons who did not raise the search and seizure issue at trial or on
direct appeal.
!d. at 224-25. Kaufman thus implicitly accepts the theory advanced by this comment, that
deterrence will be ineffective so long as any significant incentive for disobedience remains.
See id. at 225.
88. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961).
89. The elimination of all significant incentives is necessary in cases of deliberate mis-
conduct, where the police know that the only way of securing the evidence at issue is to
violate the rules. It may well be that in the case of the "blundering constable" (see Peo-
ple v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926))--where the police could have ob-
tained the evidence lawfully, but simply "blundered" or took the "easy" uay--sufficient
deterrence would be provided by exclusion of some, but not all, of the unlawfully obtained
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That this is precisely the situation with regard to the impeachment
use of statements secured in violation of Miranda is easily demon-
strated. Consider a situation where the police have lawfully arrested
a defendant and have obtained enough admissible evidence to make a
prima facie case. But their case is not strong, and so an effort is made
to elicit a statement by the defendant that would bolster it. The defen-
dant evidences some willingness to talk but when he is asked whether
he would like to speak to a lawyer first, he shrugs his shoulders and
says, "Why not?" The police know that under Miranda he must be
given a lawyer before any further questioning; they also realize that as
soon as a lawyer arrives there is little chance that any further question-
ing will be permitted. Under the Harris rule, what possible incentive
would the police have to comply with Miranda by either terminating
the interrogation or securing a lawyer? Is it not clear that any reason-
able policeman, calculating the advantages and disadvantages of secur-
ing a lawyer for the defendant before any further questioning, would
always conclude that he should proceed with the questioning in viola-
tion of Miranda?90 If the defendant then makes a statement, the net
effect of the violation will be that the police will have in their possession
an item of evidence they would not have been able to secure had they
complied with Miranda. And this evidence might very well make the
difference between winning and losing the ultimate case. It might well
persuade a defendant who would otherwise take the witness stand to
"waive" his right to do so. (And it is widely acknowledged that a de-
fendant-at least one without a criminal record-who takes the witness
stand and tells his story has a considerably better chance of acquittal
than one who stands mute.)91 Or if the defendant does take the stand,
evidence. Professor Amsterdam, in concluding that a random percentage exclusion In
search and seizure cases would provide sufficient deterrence, neglects to distinguish these
different categories of violation. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 378, 388-91 (1964). Moreover, Amsterdam was concerning himself exclusively with
violations of the Fourth Amendment, which will probably involve calculated violations
less frequently than Miranda. See note 90 infra.
90. The Miranda situation is unlike the typical search situation in that it is tailor.
made for a sequential "try it legally-if you fail, try it illegally" approach. That is, the
police can attempt to obtain a statement admissible in the case in chief by giving the
required warnings. If, however, the suspect requests a lawyer, they can then (instead of
honoring the request and thereby losing the statement) go on-given Harris-to try for
an uncounselled statement to use for impeachment. There is thus no moment at which
the police must irrevocably decide whether to follow the Constitution or not; given
Harris, a legal-illegal sequence is the most rational course.
91. See, e.g., A. AmSTERDAm, B. SEGAL & M. MILu7R, TRIAL MANUAL FOR Ti DEFENSE OF
CRIMINAL CAsFs 2-298 (1967); HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN TIIE UNITED STATES
DIsUCr COURT (Federal Defenders Program of San Diego, Inc.) 218 (1967).
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his admission could be used by the Government, ostensibly to impeach
him, but realistically to shore up its otherwise weak case. 2
It may be argued that this reflects an overly cynical view of police
decisions, that it should not be assumed that policemen will act on
the basis of a calculation of advantages rather than out of desire to
follow the law. But of course the exclusionary rule itself is based on
precisely that assumption. If policemen could be counted on to follow
the law without regard to the advantages of violation, there would be
little need for an exclusionary rule.93
B. A defendant's privilege to testify in his own behalf "cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjuiy."
Having announced that "sufficient deterrence" is provided by ex-
cluding illegally secured statements from the Government's case in
chief, the Court goes on to respond to an argument no one made:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense,
or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be construed to
include the right to commit perjury.94
92. See also State v. Brewton, 247 Ore. 241, 245, 422 P.2d 581, 583, cert. denied, 387
U.S. 943 (1967).
If we should today adopt a restrictive application of the exclusionary rule, the result
could be a major step backward. This court would in effect be saying to the over-
zealous that police officers will be free in the future to interrogate suspects secretly,
at arms length, without counsel, and without advice, so long as they use means con-
sistent with the threat-or-promise voluntariness, and so long as they understand that
they may file the information only for use to keep the defendant honest. Thus the
police could, at their option, take a calculated risk: By giving up the possibility of
using the suspect's statements in the state's case, they could obtain by unconstitu-
tional means and store away evidence to use if the defendant should elect upon trial
to take the stand.
93. Rules by their very announcement can, and probably often do, have some hortatory
effect, but the Court's conclusion has been that that effect is insufficient to protect against
deliberate police misconduct. Additionally it may take some time for the message of
Harris to sink in, for the police to realize there is a substantial incentive-and no prac-
tical disincentive-to disobey the pronouncements of Miranda. Miranda to Harris--unlike
Wolf to Mapp--is a case of advance followed by retreat, so there may be some holdover
hortatory effect.
There may be an implication in the Harris opinion that the assumption that exclu-
sionary rules have any deterrent effect on police behavior is open to question. Of
course it is, as Professor Oaks has demonstrated in his fine article. Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 87 U. CH. L. REv. 665 (1970). But one of the
reasons why the exclusionary rule may not be working effectively is precisely that it has
been riddled with limitations that provide incentive toward violation, such as the "stand-
ing" requirement and now the Harris exception. See id. at 734. Moreover, Oaks points
out that the exclusionary rule can be expected to work more effectively to prevent viola-
tions of Miranda than violations of Mapp. Id. at 666. This is probably no longer the case,
given Harris.
94. 401 U.S. at 225. The Court at one point in the opinion varies this theme as fol-
lows: "The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to une perjury
by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utter-
ances." 401 U.S. at 226. The reference to perjury derives from Justice Frankfurter's opin-
ion in Walder where he said, inter alia, "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the
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To the extent the "right to perjury" rhetoric is intended to conjure up
the assumption that trial testimony is necessarily less credible than a
statement given to the police without the safeguards of Miranda, it is
of course subject to significant qualification 5 (In Harris itself, the
District Attorney acknowledged that the defendant's pre-trial, station.
house rendition of the events for which he was convicted had been a
"false account") 96 But more fundamentally, the entire argument is a
straw man. Of course a defendant has no "right to commit perjury."
But this was hardly petitioner's argument. Neither does a defendant
have the right to commit murder, and yet the Government may not
prove that crime by means of an illegally obtained statement. Nor,
indeed, could it introduce such a statement as part of its case in chief
in a perjury prosecution. Whether it should be permitted to use it to
prove perjury in the context of a trial for a different crime is the ques.
tion, and it is not answered by denying that there is a right that no one
asserted.
defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's
disability to challenge his credibility." Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 65 (1954).
But in Walder, of course, the defendant's trial testimony was contradicted by physical
evidence whose trustworthiness was not disputed. In cases involving violation of the Fifth
Amendment-as in this case-there is some question whether the statements elicited by
the police were the accurate ones. See note 95 infra.
95. It may well be, of course, that the pre-trial statement will be true and the trial
statement false, especially where the former is inculpatory and the latter exculpatory.
The trial testimony, which is further in time from the events at issue, may well reflect a
more calculated "story" than the earlier, perhaps more spontaneous, statement. There are,
however, other considerations which suggest that the trial testimony will sometimes be
more accurate than the statement elicited by the police. Trial testimony is taken under
oath with the sanction of a perjury prosecution available, whereas the police statement
is unsworn. Trial testimony is also prepared and elicited by an attorney who is bound
not to countenance perjury in his witnesses (an obligation taken quite seriously by most
lawyers), whereas the police statement is by hypothesis given without consultation with
counsel. Most fundamentally, of course, the pre-trial statement will, by definition, have
been given without the safeguards of Miranda, safeguards designed, at least In part, to
ensure that the inherently coercive atmosphere of an in-custody police interrogation will
not elicit an untrue statement. As the Court said in Miranda: the presence of counsel
may help "to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police
and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial." 384 U.S. at 470.
96. Brief for District Attorney of New York County, supra note 13, at 12, The brief
alleged that the account of the events of January 4 was "a truthful" one, but tile jury
was deadlocked over whether petitioner was guilty for these events, The brief said that
the account of the events of January 6-for which the jury convicted-was "false." Peti.
tioner's lawyer made the following relevant point in his oral argument:
Very often when a young and inexperienced person is before the police, and that 15
what happened here and that is the only case that makes a difference, because your
professional criminal just doesn't get involved in this. He may give a false exculpa,
tory statement whereas the truth were to acquit him, but he doesn't know that, anti
he is afraid to tell the police what happened. He thinks he had better talk to his
lawyer first. So he makes up a false exculpatory statement. He can be torn to shreds
at the trial by an experienced prosecutor. That is just what happened here. But It
doesn't prove that the statements that he makes in his testimony at the trial is false,
because it may well be, that the statement unconstitutionally obtained was false.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 19, at 17.
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The real issue, never addressed by the Court, is where to strike the
balance between the state's interest in challenging the defendant's
credibility and the defendant's interest in excluding illegally secured
evidence. Of course the value of an exclusionary rule is not absolute,
but neither is the value of challenging credibility. Even the Court
suggests that not all pretrial statements may be used to impeach: before
a statement may be so used, it says, its "trustworthiness [must satisfy]
legal standards.197 This formulation, which seems to indicate that only
evidence of uncertain reliability is unavailable for impeachment use,
suggests some important questions as to which the Court's opinion
gives little guidance. For example, may physical evidence discovered as
the result of a coerced statement--as where the defendant is tortured
into telling where he hid the murder weapon-now be used to im-
peach? May an incriminating statement elicited as the result of a grant
of "use" immunity be used to discredit a defendant's testimony0 s (One
can imagine the Court paraphrasing the Harris opinion as follows: "the
shield provided by" the grant of immunity should not "be perverted
into a license to use perjury by way of defense, free from the risk of
confrontation with prior inconsistent statements.") 9 Thus the absolute
manner in which the Court rejects the "right to perjury" provides no
limiting principle capable of reasoned application to the range of other
cases likely to arise; 10 more importantly, it is not responsive to the real
issues presented by the case.
97. 401 US. at 224.
98. Consider the following case: A person is called before a grand jury or congres-
sional committee and asked a series of incriminating questions which he declines to answer
on grounds of self-incrimination. He is then granted use immunity and directed to
answer the questions, which he does. He is subsequently brought to trial on the basis of
independent evidence. If he chooses to testify on his own behalf, can the government use
his immunity-secured testimony to impeach his trial testimony? If this is so. or even if
there is any significant likelihood that this is so, then a witness might be within his
rights in refusing to answer incriminating questions under a grant of use--as distinguished
from transactional-immunity, on the ground that the immunity would not be cotermi-
nous with the privilege. This may lead the Court to require "transactional"-rather than
merely "use"--immunity before a witness may be compelled to give incriminating state-
ments. See Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548 (1971).
99. Cf. 401 US. at 226. One approach the Court might take is to permit impeachment
in those cases where the rule violated has not been applied retroactively. Under this
approach a conviction secured without counsel or as the result of a coerced confession
or plea could not be used to impeach, but a conviction secured as a result of an illegal
search and seizure or a violation of Miranda could be so used. This approach would not
help resolve the use immunity question raised above. Nor would it help resolve the ques-
tion whether a defendant's pre-trial statement obtained in violation of Miranda can be
used to contradict other witnesses testifying on defendant's behalf. Assume, for example,
that defendant told the police-in a Afiranda-violative statement-that he committed the
crime, and then a defense witness testifies that defendant was in a different city when
the crime took place: could the defendant's statement be used to contradict the alibi
testimony? (It could not, of course, be used to impeach under general principles of evi.
dence.)
100. Another unanswered question is how Harris relates to California v. Green, 899
1223
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1223 1970-1971
The Yale Law Journal
C. Had petitioner's statement been elicited by "some third person,"
it could have been used to impeach him.
The final argument offered by the Court in support of its conclusion
can best be characterized as the first half of a non sequitur:
Had inconsistent statements been made by the accused to some
third person, it could hardly be contended that the conflict could
not be laid before the jury by way of cross-examination and im-
peachment.10
U.S. 149 (1970), holding that states may constitutionally use prior inconsistent statements
against a defendant who has taken the stand not simply to impeach his testimony but
also to prove the truth of the matter earlier asserted. It is true that the trial judge In
Harris instructed the jury to consider the earlier statement only as to credibility, but the
Court does not indicate that its decision is limited by that fact. If it is not, the one-two
punch of Harris and Green could be potent indeed.
The bounds of the "principle" of Wyman v. James, permitting warrantless and uncon-
sented-to "visits" of the homes of welfare recipients to make sure the grants are not being
misused or fraudulently claimed, are similarly unclear. Can the government engage In
an unconsented-to and warrantless search of a taxpayer's home to see whether the claimed
dependents really exist? Can it similarly search the homes and places of business of all
those who receive any sort of governmental benefit, as most of us today do in one form
or another, in order to determine eligibility?
There is reason to think not. Perhaps the most regrettable feature of the Court's opin-
ion in James is the double standard it apparently applies to the claims of the poor and
the claims of the rest of us, a double standard disfavoring the former.
In relying on the state's interests in uncovering child abuse and welfare fraud to up-
hold its suspension of the warrant requirement for welfare recipients, the Court provides
a textbook example of a sort of discrimination it has repeatedly told legislatures and ad-
ministrators they are not to indulge in, namely assuming that poor people are morally
inferior to others and consequently applying a different set of rules to them. Anyone
may mistreat his child; yet, the Court surely would not uphold warrantless "visits" of
the homes of the more affluent to check for such mistreatment. And any of us may mis-
represent his eligibility for a particular form of governmental benefit, be it a farm subsidy
or a tax deduction; but with respect to the claims of the non-poor, government officials
have always had to be content with whatever sort of convincing validation the clainant
is able and willing to come up with-they have never had a mandate to "visit" his home
over his protests unless they get a warrant.
That the Court intends to retain this comparative immunity for the affluent is indi-
cated by a fallacious analogy:
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal Revenue Service
agent, in making a routine civil audit of a taxpayer's income tax return, asks that
the taxpayer produce for the agent's review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer
has asserted to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If the taxpayer refuses,
there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction and a consequent
additional tax.
Wyman v. James, 401 U.S. 309, 324 (1971). Mr. Justice Marshall's answer, here as often,
is decisive:
Mhe analogy is seriously flawed. The record shows that Mrs. James has offered to
be interviewed anywhere other than her home, to answer any questions and to pro.
vide any documentation which the welfare agency desires. The agency curtly refused
all these offers and insisted on its "right" to pry into appellee's home. Tax exemp'
tions are also governmental "bounty." A true analogy would be an Internal Revenue
Service requirement that in order to claim a dependency exemption, a taxpayer must
allow a specially trained IRS agent to invade the home for the purpose of questioning
the occupants and looking for evidence that the exemption is being properly utilized
for the benefit of the dependent. If such a system were even proposed, the cries of
constitutional outrage would be unanimous.
Id. at 343 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. 401 U.S. at 225-26. This "argument" is a popular one with the emerging majority.
1224
Vol. 80: 1198, 1971
HeinOnline  -- 80 Yale L.J. 1224 1970-1971
Harris v. New York
It is difficult to understand what conclusion is supposed to be derived
from that statement. Of course inconsistent statements made to "some
third person" could be introduced for "cross-examination and impeach-
ment." They could be introduced in the Government's case in chief
as well. For the Fifth Amendment simply does not apply to statements
made to private persons, and there is thus no constitutional distinction
between the use of such statements in the Government's case in chief
and its cross-examination for impeachment. Is the Court suggesting
that all statements made to a third person that would be admissible
should also be admissible when elicited by the Government? We
assume not: for that would-simply put-mark an end to the privilege
against self-incrimination (as well as the exclusion of evidence secured
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, which also is inapplicable to
third persons). Or is the Court expanding the scope of the privilege by
applying the rules currently applicable to statements elicited by Gov-
Mr. Justice Blackman's opinion for the Court in Wyman v. James argues, inter alia, that:
The home visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal in-
vestigation, and despite the announced fears of Mrs. James and those who would [sic]
join her, is not in aid of a criminal proceeding.
400 U.S. at 323. The relevance of this assertion is questionable at best. The state defended
its rejection of Mrs. James's offer to meet anywhere but in her home and there to provide
all relevant information, on the ground that it needed to visit the home in order to ferret
out possible welfare fraud and child abuse. Leaving aside for the moment the possibility
of criminal sanctions, it should be noted that a finding of fraud can lead to a termina-
tion of benefits, a finding of child abuse to loss of custody. Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967), a case Wyman purports not to disturb, is cr)stal clear that the Fourth
Amendment, and in particular its warrant requirement, apply to inspections which can
result only in civil sanctions. See also See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See gen-
erally Wyman v. James 400 US. 309, 339 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). But in any
event, pursuing its (irrelevant) argument that a welfare visit is not "in aid of a criminal
proceeding," the Court continues:
And if the visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal
prosecution should follow,1 2 then, even assuming that the evidence discovered upon
the home visitation is admissible, an issue upon which we express no opinion, that
is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which
necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct.
400 U.S. at 323. This passage is in several ways misleading. The statute whose citation
appears in the Court's footnote twelve, Section 145 of the New York Social Welfare Law,
defines the crime of welfare fraud and obligates welfare officials to turn over "to the ap-
propriate district attorney or other prosecuting official" any evidence of such fraud they
uncover. The Court is of course technically correct in its claim that it is not deciding
that evidence uncovered during a home visit is admissible in a criminal proceeding. For
that issue is not before it. But the issue has been settled for y-ears: it has always been the
law that evidence uncovered during a lawful search, no matter what the purpose of the
search was, is admissible in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, S92 U.S. I,
20 (1968). And evidence uncovered during home visits is of course routinely admitted in
state welfare fraud prosecutions. The Court can hardly be unaware of all this, and
demonstrates it is not by going on to "explain" that even if such evidence is ad.
mitted, that, after all, would be no different from admitting evidence of the observa.
tions of a layman. Thus as in Harris the Court attempts to legitimate the admission of
evidence gathered by government officials by noting that the same evidence would be
admissible if discovered by a private citizen. Since constitutional limitations do not bind
private citizens, this recurrent "logic" has the potency to carry the emerging majority
virtually any place it wishes to go.
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ernment agents to statements elicited by private persons? We doubt
this as well. But we have been unable to discern any other plausible
interpretation of the Court's argument.
10 2
IV. Conclusion
Our disagreement with the result reached in Harris is not, as we
previously noted, the reason we selected it for analysis and criticism.
We have no doubt that a respectable opinion affirming the conviction
could have been written. But such an opinion would have been obligated
to acknowledge that it was working important changes in the law-
that it was squarely overruling the general rule of Agnello and Walder,
significantly cutting back on central aspects of Miranda, and virtually
rejecting the very assumptions on which all exclusionary rules designed
to control deliberate police misconduct are built. This is not to say
that the Court's prior conclusions respecting these matters should be
regarded as sacrosanct. But issues of this moment deserve more sub-
stantial treatment than they were here accorded.
A thoughtful opinion acknowledging the value choices at issue and
resolving them against the defendant would at least have been candid,
though not in our view convincing. This one was neither. It was little
more than a vote-a reflection of numerical power. Its intention was
apparently not to persuade, but merely to prevail. It has prevailed-
for the moment-but, to the credit of the Supreme Court as an institu-
tion, decisions that fail to persuade often do not long outlast the men
who wrote them.
102. There is one sentence in the opinion which exceeds all others in confusion:
The conflict between petitioner's testimony in his own behalf concerning the events
of January 7 contrasted sharply with what he told the police shortly after his arrest.
401 U.S. at 225. In the first place, it is unclear what the "events of January 7" were, Tile
two count indictment charged sales on January 4 and January 6, not on January 7. The
only relevant events of January 7 were petitioner's arrest and interrogation. And there
was no conflict whatever between petitioner's trial testimony "in his own behalf" con.
cerning his arrest and what he told the police. Indeed he barely mentioned January 7
and his arrest in his trial testimony, and he did not mention it at all in his statement to
the police. Nor did he testify "in his own behalf" about the interrogation of January 7.
He was of course asked about it on cross-examination, but merely replied that he remem-
bered some of the questions but not others. How then can it be said that the "conflict
between petitioner's testimony in his own behalf concerning the events of January 7,
contrasted sharply with what he told the police . . ."? (The syntax of the sentence confutes
things even more: how can a "conflict between" one statement "contrast sharply" with
another statement?)
Perhaps the Chief Justice merely got his dates confused. He may have meant to say "the
events of January 4 or 6," in which case he would be speaking of the circumstances giving
rise to the two count indictment. But at an earlier point in the opinion lie said, more
accurately, that petitioner's statement to the police "partially contradicted" his direct tes-
timony concerning those events rather than "contrasted sharply" with it. Id. at 223.
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The Court's philosophy obviously is changing and doubtless will
continue to change as more appointments are made. Ideological ebb
and flow is an inherent, though generally more gradual, part of the
American judicial system. But failures of logic and candor are neither
inherent nor desirable in our highest Court. In that regard, the Harris
opinion seems to have taken an overdrawn academic caricature1 of
the Warren Court's methodology and used it as a recipe. What is vice
in a liberal, however, is not necessarily virtue in a conservative. In light
of President Nixon's 1968 campaign attacks on the Warren Court, it
is perhaps not surprising that his appointees should seek to reverse
many of the holdings of that Court with something more than delib-
erate speed.1°  The real disappointment is that men of the stuff of
Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White would have joined this sort of
opinion.
103. See, e-g., sources cited in Wright, supra note 7, at 770 nn.4 & 5.
104. But see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 US. 1 (1971), and, as
to Mr. Justice Blackman, James v. Valtierra, 402 US. 137, 143 (1971).
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